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RISS v. ANGEL: WASHINGTON REMODELS THE
FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS
Casey J. Little
Abstract: In Riss v. Angel, the Supreme Court of Washington declared that in disputes
between subdivision homeowners, courts must construe restrictive covenants to give effect to
the covenants' intended purposes by considering surrounding circumstances to protect the
homeowners' collective interests. The court further held that when restrictive covenants grant
discretion to architectural review committees (ARCs) to approve new construction or
remodels, ARCs or other homeowners association committees that enforce such covenants
must exercise their authority reasonably and in good faith. Riss represents a departure from
prior precedent that required courts to construe strictly the terms of restrictive covenants to
limit their effect. This Note observes that the court's shift from strict construction to intent-
based construction was wise because it clarifies Washington law on the enforceability of
restrictive covenants and was necessary because the original policy behind strictly construing
covenants in favor of the free use of land has little value when applied to subdivisions.
Furthermore, this Note argues that the reasonableness requirement for the architectural review
process will encourage homeowners associations to adopt strict procedures for their review
committees to follow when making discretionary decisions. Strict procedures will help protect
individual homeowners who may be faced with a review committee that is predisposed
against change, and that, through a process of group polarization, becomes even more likely
to make irrational decisions regarding proposed constructions in the neighborhood. This Note
concludes by proposing procedural guidelines for ARCs that will enable them to carry out
their duties under Riss.
In Riss v. Angel,' the Supreme Court of Washington addressed the
relationship between homeowners associations and restrictive
covenants.2 Homeowners associations are organizations consisting of
1. 131 Wash. 2d 612,934 P.2d 669 (1997).
2. Restrictive covenants are provisions in deeds that limit or prohibit certain uses of property.
"The purpose behind restrictive covenants is to maintain or enhance the value of lands adjacent to
one another by controlling the nature and use of surrounding lands." See Cunningham v. Hiles, 395
N.E.2d 851, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979), modified, 402 N.E.2d 17 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). Restrictive
covenants governing a subdivision typically take the form of real covenants and equitable servitudes
that run with the land. See James L. Winokur, The Afixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes:
Toward Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty. and Personal Identity, 1989 Wis. L. Rev.
1, 3. The distinction between real covenants and equitable servitudes is not of great importance in
the subdivision setting as "the theoretical mechanism by which such [subdivision] restrictions
operate is exceedingly complicated and not at all well understood. In truth this is partly because
courts, in their desire to enforce subdivision restrictions for policy reasons, have outrun their
understanding of theory." William B. Stoebuck, Running Covenants: An Analytical Primer, 52
Wash. L. Rev. 861, 907 (1977). See generally id. (discussing historical differences between real
covenants and equitable servitudes).
Washington Law Review
homeowners within residential developments, with the primary purpose
of providing and maintaining community facilities and services for the
benefit of the residents.3 Through the enforcement of restrictive
covenants, homeowners associations preserve the character of a
development.4 Restrictive covenants are recorded in property deeds and
regulate such broad issues as the permissible architectural designs of
homes, the size of mailboxes, and the types of vehicles that may be
maintained on or near a lot.5 Every individual who purchases property
within a subdivision governed by a homeowners association and subject
to restrictive covenants automatically becomes a member of the
association upon taking title and must abide by the restrictive covenants.6
A discretionary consent to construction covenant is one common type
of restrictive covenant. This type of covenant requires property owners to
seek approval from a committee composed of members of the
homeowners association before constructing a new house or remodeling
an existing dwelling.7 When determining whether to approve a
homeowner's proposed construction or remodel under a discretionary
consent covenant, these committees, known as architectural review
committees (ARCs), often consider such factors as whether the new or
altered home will be in harmony with other buildings.8 Because of the
subjective nature of such judgments, consent to construction covenants
can cause conflicts between individual homeowners and ARCs.
In Riss, the court was called upon to construe a discretionary consent
to construction covenant to determine if the board of directors of the
3. See 7 Richard R. Powell & Patrick I. Rohan, Powell on Real Property 632.1[2], at 54-12
(1998).
4. See, e.g., City of Olympia v. Plazner, 107 Wash. 2d 225, 230-31, 728 P.2d 135, 137-38 (1986)
("The ability of homeowners... to enforce restrictive covenants... helps ensure that the
community will be able to maintain its planned character and provide the lifestyle sought by its
residents in making their homes there."); Hagemann v. Worth, 56 Wash. App. 85, 88-89, 782 P.2d
1072, 1074 (1989) ("The enforcement of this covenant does nothing more than preserve to the
homeowners the residential character of the neighborhood.").
5. See Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1375, 1383-
85 (1994).
6. See Wayne S. Hyatt, Condominium and Homeowner Association Practice: Community
Association Law § 3.03(a), at47 (2d ed. 1988).
7. See, e.g., Riss v. Angel, 131 Wash. 2d 612, 616, 934 P.2d 669, 673 (1997); Bersos v. Cape
George Colony Club, 4 Wash. App. 663, 664,484 P.2d 485,486 (1971).
8. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Webster, 483 S.W.2d 647, 648 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (stating that proposal
could be denied if "not in harmony with the general surroundings of such lot"); Riss, 131 Wash. 2d
at 616, 934 P.2d at 673 (stating that covenant gives board power to consider "harmony with other
dwellings" in making decision).
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homeowners association, serving as an ARC, acted properly in rejecting
the plaintiffs' proposal to demolish their existing home and construct a
new one.9 Although the plaintiffs' proposed home complied with the
specific height, square footage, and setback requirements in the
restrictive covenants, the board summarily rejected the plan.' Under an
appeals process established by the covenants, the plaintiffs appealed the
board's decision directly to the homeowners, who voted to ratify the
decision." The plaintiffs then brought suit against the individual
homeowners, claiming that the restrictive covenants were unenforceable
and that, alternatively, the board and the association had acted
unreasonably because the plans complied with the covenants.
12
The Supreme Court of Washington held that the consent to
construction covenant was enforceable and, in doing so, announced a
new standard for interpreting subdivision covenants. Recognizing that
restrictive covenants "'protect... public and private property owners
from the increased pressures of urbanization,"'' 3 the court declared that it
will no longer strictly construe restrictive covenants governing
subdivisions to limit their impact on individual homeowners.' 4 Instead,
the court held that it will liberally construe restrictive covenants to give
effect to the intended purposes of the covenants, but will require bodies
enforcing discretionary consent to construction covenants to act
reasonably and in good faith.'" Applying this new standard, the court
ruled that the board violated the restrictive covenants because its decision
to deny the plaintiffs' plan was made without adequate investigation, was
based upon inaccurate information, and thus was unreasonable and
arbitrary.'6 The court awarded the plaintiffs delay damages, attorney fees,
and costs totaling approximately $200,000, entered jointly and severally
against the board members and individual defendant homeowners who
voted to ratify the board's decision.' 7
9. Riss, 131 Wash. 2d at 616, 934 P.2d at 673.
10. Id at 618, 934 P.2d at 674.
11. Id. at 619,934 P.2dat 674.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 622, 934 P.2d at 676 (quoting Lakes at Mercer Island Homeowners Ass'n v. Witrak, 61
Wash. App. 177, 179, 810 P.2d 27,28 (1991)).
14. Id at 623, 934 P.2d at 676.
15. Id at 625, 934 P.2d at 677.
16. Id. at 638, 934 P.2d at 684.
17. Id. at 637, 934 P.2d at 683. See infra note 87 for exact amounts.
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Riss improves Washington covenant law because it requires courts to
construe restrictive covenants according to their underlying purposes and
forces ARCs to act reasonably and in good faith. By no longer requiring
strict construction of subdivision covenants, courts will better give effect
to the purposes covenants seek to accomplish, thereby enabling
homeowners to preserve the desirable characteristics of a neighborhood
and protect property values. Moreover, the Riss decision may help
protect homeowners by imposing a reasonableness requirement on ARC
decisionmaking processes. Because unincorporated homeowners
associations face potential joint and several liability for the decisions of
ARCs, associations should reevaluate whether such committees should
have any discretion. If ARCs are granted discretion to approve proposed
remodels or construction, homeowner associations should adopt strict
procedural guidelines for their ARCs that will ensure that ARC actions
are consistent with the standards imposed by Riss.
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of homeowners
associations and restrictive covenants. Part II discusses the supreme
court's decision in Riss v. Angel. Part III analyzes the impact of Riss,
discussing both its effect on how subdivision covenants should be
interpreted and how ARCs make decisions. Finally, Part IV of this Note
proposes procedural guidelines that ARCs should implement in their
decisionmaking processes.
I. HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS AND RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS
A. Development and Structure ofHomeowners Associations
Although homeowners associations 8 are not a new creation, they have
become increasingly popular. 9 A homeowners association is an
18. This Note addresses homeowners associations. In fact, there are three types of common
interest communities: condominiums, cooperatives, and homeowners associations. The main
difference among these types of communities is their method of ownership. In condominiums, all
common property is owned by all unit owners as tenants in common, with individual units owned by
the occupants. In cooperatives, a corporate or business trust entity holds title to all the premises and
grants rights of occupancy to particular apartments. Homeowners associations are usually nonprofit
corporations that hold title to the common property, with individual lots owned separately by
individual owners. Despite these and other minor differences, the governing structures of the three
types of communities are basically the same. See generally 7 Powell & Rohan, supra note 3, 632.1,
at 54-11; see also Hyatt, supra note 6, § 1.05, at 10-22.
19. Homeowners associations date back to the early seventeenth century in England. The
association concept first appeared in the United States in the early nineteenth century with the
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organization consisting of homeowners within a residential development,
whose primary purpose is "to provide and maintain community facilities
and services for the common enjoyment of the residents., 20 It is
estimated that by the year 2000 there will be approximately 225,000
associations with fifty million members.21 Their growth has, in part,
resulted from home buyers moving to suburban developments where
homeowners associations are more prevalent.'
Homeowners associations serve three primary functions: levying and
collecting assessments; managing and maintaining common property for
the benefit of residents; and enforcing covenants that govern
developments.' They derive authority to carry out these functions from
several documents, including the declaration of covenants, conditions,
and restrictions (CC&Rs), the association's bylaws and articles of
incorporation, and the deeds to the property within a development.24
The CC&Rs for the subdivision are of primary importance in the
establishment of a homeowners association. The declaration generally
establishes the covenants by which all owners within the development
agree to be bound and the respective obligations of the owners and the
association.' Developers record the declaration in the land records
before any lots are sold. 6 The covenants within the declaration run with
the land27 and bind subsequent property owners.28 The covenants are
development of Louisberg Square in Boston in 1826 and Grammercy Park in New York in 183 1. See
7 Powell & Rohan, supra note 3, 632.2, at 54-32. Following the introduction of these associations,
their number remained relatively few in number so that by 1962 there were still less than 500. Within
the last 35 years, however, a dramatic rise in the number of associations in the United States
occurred. By 1992, there were 150,000 associations governing 32 million people, roughly 12% of
the nation's population. See Larry J. Smith et al., Gated Communities: Private Solution or Public
Dilemma?, 29 Urb. Law. 413, 415 (1997) (citing figures that include each type of common interest
community).
20. See 7 Powell & Rohan, supra note 3, 632.1[2], at 54-12.
21. See Gillette, supra note 5, at 1375 n.1 (citing figures that include each type of common
interest community).
22. See 7 Powell & Rohan, supra note 3, 631, at 54-8.
23. Id. 632.1[2], at 54-14 to 54-15.
24. See Hyatt, supra note 6, § 7.02, at 356-59.
25. Id. at 356-57.
26. See 7 Powell & Rohan, supra note 3, 632.4[l][b], at 54-84. The developer records the
declaration at the same time as the subdivision plat. Id. T 632.4[1][a], at 54-84.
27. See Hyatt, supra note 6, § 1.05(b)(3), at 19. Treating CC&Rs as running covenants ensures
that they will remain in place indefinitely and bind all future owners. Id.
28. See id § 3.03(a), at 47.
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reciprocally enforceable agreements among homeowners29 that regulate
anything from the architectural design and use of structures to the
number of pets or guests allowed.3" "Neighborhood uniformity is
preserved"' by enforcing the covenants.
Another legal document essential to an association is its bylaws,
which establish procedures for the internal government and operation of
the association.32 The bylaws are not always recorded, but may be
incorporated by reference in the declaration.33 Whereas declarations have
been likened to an association's constitution, bylaws can be seen as the
statutes that detail the day-to-day operations of the association.34
After they are formed, but before the title transfer of the common
property to the homeowners association, an association usually
incorporates.35 "Incorporation not only provides greater certainty to the
association as the fee title holder but also brings to bear the entire body
of statutory and case law developed in the jurisdiction's corporate law. '36
In conjunction with the declaration and bylaws, the articles of
incorporation establish the general boundaries of the association,
including the governing structure, financing, assessment mechanisms,
voting and control procedures, and the specification of ownership.37
29. See Winokur, supra note 2, at 3.
30. See Gillette, supra note 5, at 1384-85. Washington courts have examined various types of
restrictive covenants. See, e.g., Riss v. Angel, 131 Wash. 2d 612, 616, 934 P.2d 669, 673 (1997)
(provisions calling for approval of some governing body before any construction or remodeling may
proceed); Metzner v. Wojdyla, 125 Wash. 2d 445, 447, 886 P.2d 154, 155 (1994) (restrictions
preventing structures from being used as anything other than single-family residences); Mains Farm
Homeowners Ass'n v. Worthington, 121 Wash. 2d 810, 813-14, 854 P.2d 1072, 1073 (1993)
(same); Mt. Baker Park Club, Inc. v. Colcock, 45 Wash. 2d 467, 468, 275 P.2d 733, 733-34 (1954)
(requirements on minimum setback); Foster v. Nehls, 15 Wash. App. 749, 750, 551 P.2d 768, 770
(1976) (limitations on maximum height of homes); Beros v. Cape George Colony Club, 4 Wash.
App. 663, 664, 484 P.2d 485, 486 (1971) (provisions calling for approval of some governing body
before any construction or remodeling may proceed).
31. Winokur, supra note 2, at 3.
32. See Hyatt, supra note 6, § 7.02, at 357.
33. See, e.g., Lake Arrowhead Community Club, Inc. v. Looney, 112 Wash. 2d 288, 296 n.4, 770
P.2d 1046, 1050-51 nA (1989) ("[T]he bylaws need not have been recorded for [plaintiff] to
become bound by them. For example, he could have become bound through express agreement in a
separate document [e.g., the declaration or deed].").
34. See Hyatt, supra note 6, § 7.02, at 357.
35. Id. § 2.02, at 27.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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Associations carry out their responsibilities through a board of
directors, officers, and agents. The creating documents usually grant
broad powers to the board of directors, which serves as the association's
policymaking and supervisory body."8 The officers, in turn, are
responsible for carrying out the board's policies in the day-to-day
operation of the association."
Typically, associations also form an architectural review committee
(ARC),40 which operates to maintain architectural uniformity within a
subdivision by enforcing the subdivision's restrictive covenants.4 '
Although restrictive covenants often specify exact height and size
requirements for structures, covenants may grant ARCs discretion to
approve new construction or remodels of residences based on subjective
considerations such as whether the proposed change is in harmony with
the surrounding development.42
The developer of a subdivision will usually retain control over both
common property and the association until a specified number of lots are
sold within the subdivision.43 The deeds used to convey the individual
lots to purchasers and the deed conveying the common property to the
association describe what is owned by whom and generally indicate the
relationship to the association through reference to the recorded
declaration.'
B. Judicial Treatment of Restrictive Covenants in the Context of
Homeowners Associations
1. Overview
Traditionally, restrictive covenants have been disfavored in the law.4"
They were historically regarded-as encumbrances that restricted the free
38. Id. § 6.02(a), at 207-08. Under Washington law, a board stands in a fiduciary relationship
with respect to an association. Wash. Rev. Code § 64.38.025(1) (1996).
39. See 7 Powell & Rohan, supra note 3, 632.1[2], at 54-15.
40. The board may also function as an ARC. See Riss v. Angel, 131 Wash. 2d 612, 616, 934 P.2d
669, 673 (1997). However, a separate committee is often established with the board acting as an
appeal board. See Hyatt, supra note 6, § 6.03(g), at 297.
41. Hyatt, supra note 6, § 6.03(g), at 297.
42. See cases cited supra note 8.
43. See Hyatt, supra note 6, § 4.03(c), at 94.
44. Id. § 2.02, at 27.
45. See Stoebuck, supra note 2, at 904.
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alienation of land46 and operated in "derogation of the common-law right
to use land for all lawful purposes. 47 In response to these concerns,
courts established specific conditions that had to be satisfied before they
would treat the covenants as running with the land:48 the covenant
had to be enforceable between the original covenanting parties; the
parties must have intended the covenant to run; the covenant had to
"touch and concern" the land; "horizontal privity"'49 between the original
covenanting parties must have existed; and "vertical privity"5 between
the covenanting party and the remote party sought to be benefited or
burdened must have been present."
Courts also employed the doctrine of strict construction to limit the
effects of restrictive covenants. 2 The doctrine requires courts to
narrowly construe covenants according to their terms and limit the
application of those terms to situations explicitly covered in the
covenants. 3 Although the doctrine of strict construction remains the rule
in the majority of jurisdictions,54 some courts that ostensibly employ the
doctrine have softened the rule. For example, these courts have given
great weight to the intent of the contracting parties to avoid defeating the
purposes for which the covenants were created.55 In at least three states,
strict construction of restrictive covenants no longer applies. 6
46. See id.; see also Roger A. Cunningham et al., The Law of Property § 2.2, at 35 (1984) (tracing
public policy in favor of free alienability of land back to Quia Emptores in 1290).
47. Burton v. Douglas County, 65 Wash. 2d 619,622,399 P.2d 68,70 (1965).
48. See Stoebuck, supra note 2, at 867.
49. "Horizontal privity" exists if the covenant was created at the time when one of the parties
transferred a property interest to the other. See id at 879.
50. "Vertical privity" refers to the relationship between the original covenanting party and
subsequent owners of the land. "[T]he burden of a real covenant may be enforced against remote
parties only when they have succeeded to the covenantor's estate in land." Id. at 876.
51. See id. at 867.
52. See, e.g., Jones v. Williams, 56 Wash. 588, 591, 106 P. 166, 168 (1910).
53. Id.
54. See Yogman v. Parrott, 937 P.2d 1019, 1023 n.2 (Or. 1997) ("The maxim that restrictive
covenants are to be construed strictly is the majority rule.").
55. See, e.g., Ezer v. Fuchsloch, 160 Cal. Rptr. 486, 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (noting limitation
on rule of strict construction that 'the intent of the parties and the object of the deed or restriction
should govern, giving [the] instrument a just and fair interpretation' (quoting Lincoln Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Riviera Estates Ass'n, 87 Cal. Rptr. 150, 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970))); Hanley v. Misischi,
302 A.2d 79, 82 (R.IL 1973) (stating that strict construction "will not be used to destroy the very
purpose for which the restriction was established").
56. See Brandon v. Price, 314 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Ky. 1958) ("mhe old-time doctrine of strict
construction no longer applies."); Joslin v. Pine River Dev. Corp., 367 A.2d 599, 601 (N.H. 1976)
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The advent of zoning laws has affected how courts view restrictive
covenants." Zoning laws typically divide a municipality into four types
of districts, designating appropriate land uses within each. 8 These types
of zoning regulations reflect the modem philosophy that it is desirable to
segregate land uses. The goal of zoning is to promote and maintain
homogeneity within each respective district, thus creating a community
"character."
59
The movement away from strict interpretation of subdivision cov-
enants gained momentum with the development of zoning laws. Because
zoning laws already severely limit the uses of property, the additional
restraints that restrictive covenants impose on land may be viewed as de
minimus. As such, courts are willing to more broadly interpret and
enforce restrictive covenants, especially when the covenants are part of a
general scheme within a subdivision.' What once were considered title
encumbrances are now more likely to be viewed as ways to efficiently
allocate resources using private agreements." Pre-Riss Washington case
law also reflects this increasing judicial acceptance of restrictive
covenants.62
("The modem viewpoint is that the former policy of strictly construing restrictive covenants is no
longer operative."); Candlelight Hills Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Goodwin, 763 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tex.
App. 1988) (explaining that by statute restrictive covenants are to be liberally construed).
57. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of comprehensive zoning in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
58. The four types of districts are residential, commercial, industrial, and special. See 12 Powell &
Rohan, supra note 3, § 79C.01, at 79C-7.
59. See Winokur, supra note 2, at 21.
60. See, e.g., Brandon, 314 S.W.2d at 523 ("The general scheme and plan of the subdivision is an
important factor [when construing an applicable restrictive covenant.]"); Traficante v. Pope, 341
A.2d 782, 785 (N.H. 1975) ("Where a general scheme of development can be shown, the intent to
benefit land retained or previously sold by the grantor-developer will be implied so as to permit
enforcement of restrictions uniformly imposed in furtherance of the overall design."); Mt. Baker
Park Club v. Colcock, 45 Wash. 2d 467, 471, 275 P.2d 733, 735 (1954) ("[O]wners of land have a
right in equity to enforce covenants to which they are not parties when it appears that a
general ... plan for development... has been adopted, which plan is designed to make it more
attractive for residential purposes by ... restrictions imposed on... [the] lots.").
61. See Winokur, supra note 2, at 4-5 ("But as the Industrial Revolution completed the great
transformation of feudal society into modem industrial capitalism, courts began to see promissory
servitudes as efficiently allocating resources and enhancing individual liberty.").
62. See, e.g., Lakes at Mercer Island Homeowners Ass'n v. Witrak, 61 Wash. App. 177, 810 P.2d
27 (1991); see also Leighton v. Leonard, 22 Wash. App. 136,589 P.2d 279 (1978).
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2. Pre-Riss Washington Case Law
Prior to Riss, courts typically relied on the standard established in
Burton v. Douglas County63 to interpret restrictive covenants. The Burton
standard required strict construction of restrictive covenants. Drawing on
prior Washington case law, the court set forth principles of construction.
These principles required courts to give effect to the clear, unambiguous
language of the covenants, refrain from extending the covenants to
include any use not expressed clearly, and resolve doubts in favor of the
free use of land.'
The Washington Court of Appeals, however, began to question the
doctrine of strict construction of subdivision covenants required by
Burton.65 In 1978, one appellate court noted that "Etihe policy favoring
the free use of land has... undergone substantial erosion. As public
restrictions in the form of zoning have gained favor, so have private
restrictions., 66 Another court in 1991 expressly declined to construe
strictly a subdivision covenant.67 The court explained that although strict
construction may retain "some validity" when a dispute involves a
homeowner and the maker of a covenant, which is typically the
subdivision developer, "it has limited value when the conflict is between
homeowners."68 The court noted that subdivision restrictions protect
63. 65 Wash. 2d 619, 399 P.2d 68 (1965). The Burton court incorporated the policy of strict
construction that the supreme court first established in 1910. See Jones v. Williams, 56 Wash. 588,
591, 106 P. 166, 168 (1910). The Jones court reasoned that real estate, as an article of commerce,
constantly changes uses to meet the needs of an ever-changing economy, and to saddle land with
restrictions that inhibit the expansion of commerce contradicts the "well-recognized business policy
of the country." Id. at 592, 106 P. at 168; see also Leighton, 22 Wash. App. at 141, 589 P.2d at 282
(citing Burton standard); Lenhoffv. Birch Bay Real Estate, Inc., 22 Wash. App. 70,72-73,587 P.2d
1087, 1089 (1978) (same).
64. Burton, 65 Wash. 2d at 621-22, 399 P.2d at 70.
65. See, e.g., Leighton, 22 Wash. App. at 141,589 P.2d at 282.
66. Id. (citing Stoebuck, supra note 2, at 919-20).
67. Witrak 61 Wash. App. 177, 810 P.2d 27. The dispute in Witrak concerned the planting of a
row of 12 Douglas Fir trees along the boundary of a homeowner's lot. Id. at 178, 810 P.2d at 28. The
subdivision covenants prohibited fences along lot boundaries higher than six feet and required the
architectural control committee to approve any fence prior to construction. Id at 179, 810 P.2d at 28.
The defendant homeowner sought strict judicial construction of the covenant, which would have
excluded a row of trees from the covenant's definition of a fence. The court declined to do so,
instead holding that the overall purposes of the covenants included maintaining aesthetic harmony,
preserving an open natural appearance, and maintaining the view and light of each homeowner.
Allowing a row of trees along the boundary of a lot would contradict the collective interest of the
subdivision. Id. at 181, 810 P.2d at 29-30.
68. Id. at 180, 810 P.2d at 29.
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property owners from the "increased pressures of urbanization."69
Furthermore, the court explained that in a dispute between homeowners,
rather than strictly construing subdivision covenants, it would place
"special emphasis on arriving at an interpretation that protects the
homeowners' collective interests. 70
Perhaps sensing the growing discord among the courts of appeals, the
Supreme Court of Washington announced in Mains Farm Homeowners
Ass'n v. Worthington that it would reexamine the rule of strict
construction in an appropriate case.7' Riss v. Angel gave the court such an
opportunity.
II. RISS v. ANGEL
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 1992, William and Carolyn Riss purchased a residential lot in
Mercia Heights, a subdivision in the city of Clyde Hill.72 Restrictive
covenants, recorded by the original developer in the 1950s, governed
the subdivision and required the Mercia Homeowners Association to
approve any new construction or remodeling.73 The association,
originally organized as a nonprofit corporation, consisted of the
development's homeowners.74 In 1985, the corporation administratively
69. lit at 179, 810 P.2d at 28.
70. Id. at 180-81, 810 P.2d at 29. In arriving at this conclusion, the court relied on the supreme
court holding in Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wash. 2d 657, 801 P.2d 222 (1990). The Berg court
adopted the "context rule" for interpreting contracts, rejecting the "plain meaning" principle. Id at
665-69, 801 P.2d at 227-30. The Witrak court explained:
In Berg the Supreme Court recognized that even the most ordinary words are only understood in
the context of the surrounding document, the subject matter and objective of the contract, the
surrounding circumstances, the subsequent acts and conduct of the parties, and the
reasonableness of the respective interpretations of the contrct.... Of particular interest to this
case is the Berg court's emphasis on rejecting interpretations that are unreasonable and
imprudent and accepting those which make the contract reasonable and just.
Witrak, 61 Wash. App. at 181, 810 P.2d at 29.
71. Mains Farm Homeowners Ass'n v. Worthington, 121 Wash. 2d 810, 816, 854 P.2d 1072,
1074 (1993) (stating that "rule of strict construction should be reexamined in an appropriate case
with a proper record"). Mains involved an action brought by a homeowners association alleging that
an adult family home violated the subdivision covenant that property was to be used for single-
family residential purposes only. I at 813, 854 P.2d at 1073.
72. Riss v. Angel, 131 Wash. 2d 612, 615-16, 934 P.2d 669, 673 (1997).
73. Id. at 616, 934 P.2d at 673.
74. Id.
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dissolved, leaving the homeowners to govern the subdivision as an
unincorporated association acting through an elected board of directors."
The covenants governing the subdivision contained express requirements
for residences, including minimum square footage, minimum setback,
and maximum roof heights.76 In addition, the covenants granted the
association's board of directors the authority to approve or disapprove
any proposed construction or remodeling within the subdivision.77 In
1990, the association amended the covenants to allow aggrieved owners
to appeal board decisions directly to the Mercia homeowners, who would
then vote whether to overturn the board's decision.
Following an open meeting, the board rejected the Risses' plan to
replace their existing house with a new residence, even though the plan
complied with all of the specific restrictions enunciated in the covenants,
including the square footage, height, and setback requirements. 9 In a
letter to the Risses, the board explained that it rejected the proposed
house because of its height, bulk, exterior finish, and proximity to
neighboring houses. The board did not, however, specify how the
proposed plan could be modified to satisfy the covenants."
The Risses appealed the board's decision to the Mercia homeowners.
Twenty-four of the thirty-four lot owners cast votes, with a final count of
twenty-one to three against approval of the Risses' plan.8' The Risses
then brought an action in superior court against the individual members
of the association. They claimed that the covenants were unenforceable
and that the board had acted unreasonably in rejecting their plan because
75. Id.
76. The express restrictions established a 1400 minimum square footage requirement and
prevented rooflines from rising more than 20 feet above the highest point of finished grade on the
lot. Id.
77. The consent to construction provision stated:
As to improvements, construction and alterations in Mercia Heights addition, the... Mercia
Corporation shall have the right to refuse to approve the design, finishing or painting of any
construction or alteration which is not suitable or desirable in said addition for any reason,
aesthetic or otherwise... [considering] harmony with other dwellings ... the effect on outlook
of adjoining or neighboring property and any and all other factors which in their opinion shall
affect the desirability or suitability of such proposed structure, improvement or alterations.
Id.
78. Id. at 616-17, 934 P.2d at 673.
79. Id. at 618, 934 P.2d at 674.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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the proposed home complied with the covenants. Five lot owners signed
a stipulation stating that they would not oppose the Risses' proposal and
agreed to be bound by the court's decision."2 The remaining lot owners
were defendants at trial.83
The trial court held that the covenants were enforceable, but that the
association had acted unreasonably in rejecting the Risses' plan." It
concluded that the association could not restrict the size, height, and
proximity to neighbors of the Risses' proposed home beyond the
requirements stated in the covenants." The court also found that the
association had acted unreasonably by failing to compare the isses'
proposed home with other residences in the neighborhood, failing to
investigate thoroughly, and relying upon inaccurate information in
making its decision. 6 The court awarded the isses delay damages,
attorney fees, and costs totaling approximately $200,000, entered jointly
and severally against the individual defendant homeowners.87
The homeowners appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.88 Based
on a strict construction of the covenants, the court of appeals held that
the board lacked the discretion to deny approval for the isses' proposed
house because their plan satisfied all the specific requirements of the
covenants.8 9 Thereafter, the homeowners appealed to the Supreme Court
of Washington.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 619, 934 P.2d at 674.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 619-20, 934 P.2d at 674-75.
86. Id. at 620, 934 P.2d at 675.
87. The trial court awarded the Risses delay damages of $103,989.85 and attorney fees and costs
ofS102,250.3 1. Id
88. Riss v. Angel, 80 Wash. App. 553, 912 P.2d 1028 (1996), aff'd, 131 Wash. 2d 612, 934 P.2d
669 (1997). The court of appeals held that the restrictive covenants were enforceable but were to be
strictly construed, and that the board had acted unreasonably in rejecting the Risses' plan. Id.
89. Id at 562-63, 912 P.2d at 1033-34. The court of appeals held that the Mercia homeowners
were to be treated as the drafters of the covenants because in the process of amending the covenants
in 1990, they had examined the restrictions and voted not to amend them. Therefore, according to the
court of appeals the covenants were to be strictly construed. Id. at 558, 912 P.2d at 1031. The
supreme court did not adopt this reasoning, merely noting the court of appeals' reasoning and saying
nothing further regarding it. Riss, 131 Wash. 2d at 621,934 P.2d at 675.
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B. The Supreme Court of Washington Abandons Strict Construction
Although the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the appellate
court's decision, it did so on different grounds. The court held that the
board possessed the authority under the covenants to make discretionary
decisions regarding whether to deny approval for a proposed remodel or
new construction even if a proposed plan complied with all the
requirements specified in the covenants." However, the court declared
that ARCs must exercise their discretion reasonably and in good faith.9'
Applying this standard, the court found that the Mercia board failed to
act reasonably in rejecting the Risses' plan.92
In its decision, the supreme court established a new framework for
interpreting restrictive covenants when disputes involve subdivision
homeowners.93 The court found that the traditional principle requiring
strict construction of restrictive covenants should not apply in disputes
between homeowners.94 The doctrine of strict construction of covenants
against the grantor, which in these cases would be the developer of the
subdivision, is similar to the contract principle that ambiguities in
contracts will be construed against the drafter.9" When parties other than
the developer attempt to enforce restrictive covenants, however, this
justification does not apply, because neither the party seeking
enforcement nor the party challenging the covenant created the
covenant.96
In this situation, the court will interpret the covenant in the following
manner. First, it will ascertain and give effect to those purposes intended
by the covenants.97 Second, the court will resolve ambiguities about the
intent of those who established the covenants by considering evidence of
the surrounding circumstances. 98 Finally, the court will attempt to
90. Riss, 131 Wash. 2d at 628, 934 P.2d at 678.
91. Id. at 625, 934 P.2d at 677.
92. Id. at 630, 934 P.2d at 679.
93. Id. at 623-24, 934 P.2d at 676-77.
94. Id. at 623, 934 P.2d at 676.
95. In Washington, "contract language subject to interpretation is construed most strongly against
the party who drafted it." Guy Stickney, Inc. v. Underwood, 67 Wash. 2d 824, 827, 410 P.2d 7, 9
(1966).
96. See Mains Farm Homeowners Ass'n v. Worthington, 121 Wash. 2d 810, 816, 854 P.2d 1072,
1074 (1993) (noting this difference).
97. Riss, 131 Wash. 2d at 623, 934 P.2d at 676.
98. Id.
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interpret the covenant in a way that will protect the collective interest of
the homeowners."
After establishing the appropriate framework for interpreting
restrictive covenants, the Riss court discussed how ARCs must exercise
their discretion under a general consent to construction provision. Citing
decisions from other jurisdictions,"° the court declared that covenants
requiring homeowners to seek approval from an ARC (or similar body)
before construction or remodeling will be upheld provided that the ARC
exercises its authority consistently, reasonably, and in good faith.'' An
ARC may not use a general consent to construction covenant, however,
to impose restrictions on a lot that are "more burdensome" than those
contained in specific covenants.1
02
Turning to the facts presented in Riss, the court stated that the specific
minimum square footage and maximum height restrictions did not
foreclose consideration of bulk and size under the more general consent
provision.0 3 Under the general consent provision, the board could
consider the structure's harmony with other dwellings, its effect on
adjoining or neighboring property's outlook, and all other factors that
affect the desirability or suitability of the proposed structure,
improvement, or alteration." 4 When dealing with minimum or maximum
specific requirements, the court found that the board lacked discretion to
permit any house with less than the minimum or more than the maximum
requirement.'0 5
Although the court found that under the general consent provision the
board possessed the discretionary power to deny the Risses' application,
99. Id at 623-24, 934 P.2d at 676-77.
100. Id. at 624, 934 P.2d at 677 (citing cases including Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, Inc., 211
P.2d 302 (Cal. 1949), Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., 449 P.2d 361 (Colo. 1969), Alliegro v. Home
Owners of Edgewood Hills, Inc., 122 A.2d 910 (Del. Ch. 1956), and Winslette v. Keeler, 137 S.E.2d
288 (Ga. 1964)).
101. Id at 625,934 P.2d at 677.
102. Id. But see infra note 137 (discussing inconsistency of this statement when applied in Riss).
103. Riss, 131 Wash. 2d at 626, 934 P.2d at 678.
104. Id.
105. To illustrate, the court used an example of a proposed 7000-square-foot house in a
neighborhood with average homes of 2000 to 3000 square feet; although the proposed home satisfies
the minimum requirement of 1400 square feet, it would nonetheless remain "inharmonious" with the
surrounding development, and the board could use its discretion to deny approval for such a plan.
However, the board would have no authority to allow a proposed home with only 1000 square feet.
Id.
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it held that the board acted unreasonably in exercising this power.'06 The
court stressed that the focal point of a court's review should be an ARC's
decisionmaking process or procedure, which must not be unreasonable. 7
It listed numerous examples of such "unreasonable decisionmaking" by
the Mercia board, including the board's rejection letter to the Risses,
which was stated in conclusory language; the board's failure to consult
an architect before it made its decision; and the board's failure to make
any objective size and height comparisons with existing houses, although
these were reportedly major concerns of the board. 0 8 As a result, the
court held the board members and the homeowners who had ratified the
board's decision, as members of an unincorporated association, jointly
and severally liable for violating the covenants."°
III. RISS COMPORTS WITH PUBLIC POLICY AND PROTECTS
HOMEOWNERS FROM IRRATIONAL DECISIONMAKING
BY ARCS
The Riss decision significantly improves Washington covenant law.
The court's rejection of the doctrine of strict construction will help
protect home buyers' investments because subdivision covenants help
maintain property values."0 By focusing on "homeowners' collective
interests" when interpreting subdivision covenants, courts will more
effectively achieve the covenants' purposes. Moreover, the
reasonableness and good faith standard imposed on ARC decisions will
protect individual homeowners from the irrational decisions these
committees may make. In response to Riss, homeowners associations
should adopt strict procedural guidelines for the ARC to follow, which
106. Id. at 628, 934 P.2d at 679.
107. The court noted that '"[a]s with questions of substantive validity, a court may examine the
fact-finding and other procedures undertaken by association officials in the course of judicial
determination of whether the association's [ad hoe decision on architectural plans] is reasonable."'
Id. at 630, 934 P.2d at 679 (quoting Robert G. Natelson, Law of Properly Owners Associations § 5.2,
at 173 (1989)). The court also stated that "two of the board members inaccurately representing the
impact of the structure is not part of a reasonable decisionmaking process." Id. at 629, 934 P.2d at
679 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 628, 934 P.2d at 679.
109. Id. at 636, 934 P.2d at 683. The court remanded the case for further fact-finding to deter-
mine which homeowners voted to ratify the board's decision. Id. at 637, 934 P.2d at 683.
110. Restrictive covenants protect investments in land because "the value of property often
depends in large measure upon maintaining the character of the neighborhood in which it is
situated." Traficante v. Pope, 341 A.2d 782, 784 (N.H. 1975).
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will ensure that rationality is forced back into ARC decisions and shield
the associations from liability for the ARC's acts.
A. A Shift to Intent-Based Construction Better Protects
Homeowners' Investments
The Riss decision comports with public policy. The policy underlying
strict construction of restrictive covenants-enabling land to change uses
as the economy grows-is no longer a primary concern in modem
subdivisions. The Supreme Court of Washington first established the
principle of strict construction almost ninety years ago."' At that time,
the demands of a burgeoning economy and population necessitated
flexible land use."' Restrictive covenants limited the ability of land
owners and subsequent owners to use land freely for some desired
purpose, thus diminishing the land's value."'
Interpreting restrictive covenants as a value-diminishing burden
makes less sense given present zoning laws and the increasing
importance of residential developments." 4 Subdivision covenants do not
radically alter the way land is used, but only ensure that a district zoned
as residential will remain that way. This allows homeowners to protect
one of the biggest investments they have: their homes."5 Restrictive
covenants protect investments in land because "the value of property
often depends in large measure upon maintaining the character of the
neighborhood in which it is situated,""' 6 and restrictive covenants, such
as consent to construction covenants, help ensure that unwanted changes
will not occur.
111. Jones v. Williams, 56 Wash. 588, 106 P. 166 (1910).
112. Id. at 592, 106 P. at 168.
113. Id
114. See, e.g., Mains Farm Homeowners Ass'n v. Worthington, 121 Wash. 2d 810, 816, 854 P.2d
1072, 1074 (1993) ("Subdivision covenants tend to enhance, not inhibit, the efficient use of land.")
(quoting Robert D. Brussack, Group Homes, Families, and Meaning in the Law of Subdivision
Covenants, 16 Ga. L. Rev. 33, 42 (1981)). But see Winokur, supra note 2, at 19-21 (arguing that
there is little hard evidence that segregation of land uses enhances value of land).
115. The home buyer "is making a major investment, in many instances the largest investment of
his life." Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ill. 1979). The median price
of all homes bought in the United States in 1995 was $147,700. The mortgage payments on these
houses represented, on average, 32.6% of the home-buyer's income. U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Statistical Abstract of the United States 1996: The National Data Book 725, tbl. 1202 (116th ed.
1996).
116. Traficante v. Pope, 341 A.2d 782, 784 (N.H. 1975).
Washington Law Review
The new rule for interpreting subdivision covenants in Washington
allows courts to implement more effectively the purposes of these useful
private agreements. When a covenant is clear and unambiguous, it will
be given effect as stated; the new standard does not change this. In the
case of ambiguity in the covenant, however, the new standard will better
protect homeowners' investments. If the covenant is ambiguous, the goal
of the new standard is arriving at an interpretation that protects the
homeowners' collective interest.17 This goal allows courts to consider all
the circumstances within a subdivision. The principle of strict
construction, by contrast, merely requires courts to resolve doubts in
favor of the free use of land. Rather than being boxed in by the strict
construction doctrine, the new standard will allow courts to weigh the
equities in each case and arrive at a just interpretation.
B. The Reasonableness Requirement Helps Protect Homeowners from
Irrational Decisions Made by ARCs
To balance the interests of associations and individual homeowners,
the Riss court required ARCs to follow reasonable procedures when
making discretionary decisions. Although the Riss court's standard for
interpreting covenants favors associations by liberally interpreting
covenants,"8 the court limited associations' power by requiring ARCs
acting under a consent to construction covenant to act reasonably and in
good faith. The court acknowledged that it will not simply defer to the
judgment of an ARC even if its decision is made in good faith." 9 Thus,
to protect individual homeowners burdened by restrictive covenants, an
ARC must be able to prove its decisionmaking process is reasonable. 20
Evidence suggests, however, that ARCs may be prone to make
irrational decisions because of two main factors. First, their members
lack expertise in real estate management. Second, ARCs may be
predisposed against change, a tendency that is only heightened by the
phenomenon of group polarization.
117. Riss v. Angel, 131 Wash. 2d 612, 623-24,934 P.2d 669,676-77 (1997).
118. Not strictly construing restrictive covenants would enhance the possible scope of the
restrictions. Thus, because an association maintains control over the development by use of
restrictive covenants, the association's power is necessarily increased.
119. Riss, 131 Wash. 2d at 632-33,934 P.2d at 681.
120. Id. at 630, 934 P.2d at 680 ("Plaintiffs' evidence supported their claim of arbitrary,
unreasonable decisionmaking.").
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1. Lack of Expertise
Members of ARCs almost always consist exclusively of volunteers
with no professional expertise in the real estate business.' They may be
ill-equipped to determine whether a proposed project will increase or
decrease (or, for that matter, have any effect at all on) the development's
property values, or have an impact on other homes. Similarly, members
may misinterpret proposals because they lack knowledge regarding
architecture. Furthermore, members may not truly understand the
intricacies of the applicable covenants they must enforce.'2 As a result,
ARC decisions may be based on sloppy and inadequate investigation.
2. Predisposition Against Change
In addition, ARCs may be predisposed against change because their
members have a vested interest in any decision. Since changes on any
one homeowner's property can affect the value of surrounding property,
committee members will likely attempt to protect their property values
by either allowing or denying a proposed construction or remodel. In
situations in which it is difficult to determine whether a proposed change
will impact property values, members most likely will vote against the
change.
Compounding the problem of ARCs' predisposition against change is
the social-psychological phenomenon of group polarization," which
predicts that members of ARCs will become even more opposed to
change when they discuss a proposal. Group polarization describes the
tendency of group discussion to strengthen the prevailing opinions of
individual group members. 24
121. See, e.g., Hyatt, supra note 6, § 6.02(a), at 208 ("Officers and directors are almost always
volunteers who serve as an additional function of their home life, rather than as a part of their
everyday work life."); Winokur, supra note 2, at 64 (describing associations as "composed of and
often managed by resident amateurs, [that] often seem inept in the delicate task of enforcing
restrictions against neighbors").
122. See, e.g., infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text (discussing board's failure to take into
account actual height restriction contained in covenant).
123. For a general discussion on the theory of group polarization and its history, see David G.
Myers, Social Psychology 331-39 (5th ed. 1996). See also David G. Meyers & Helmut Lamm, The
Group Polarization Phenomenon, 83 Psychol. Bull. 602 (1976).
124. Group polarization has been confirmed by "dozens of studies." Myers, supra note 123, at
333. See, e.g., Ethan Gologor, Group Polarization in a Non-Risk-Taking Culture, 8 J. Cross-Cultural
Psychol. 331 (1977) (finding group polarization among Liberian high school students discussing
various "culturally relevant" topics); Verlin B. Hinsz & James H. Davis, Persuasive Arguments
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At least two theories have been put forward explaining the
phenomenon of group polarization: informational influence and
normative influence."z Under the informational influence model (also
known as the persuasive argument theory), group members influence
each other by exchanging information while conversing. 26 During a
discussion, group members are exposed to new and persuasive
information, which often strengthens an individual's initial opinion.'27
The normative influence model (also known as the social comparison/
value theory) explains that group polarization results "from the
dependence of individuals on the valued opinions of others and their
desire to be at least as extreme as or, preferably, even more extreme than
their peers in the socially desirable or prevailing direction."''  People like
to be liked and may express stronger opinions after discovering that other
members of a group with which they identify share the same views.'29
Under either model, one would expect to find group polarization among
ARCs that will have the overall effect of strengthening the ARC's
prejudice against change.
Theory, Group Polarization, and Choice Shifts, 10 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 260 (1984)
(confirming group polarization among college student subjects and arguing that both number and
persuasiveness of arguments presented during discussions affected degree of overall polarization);
Jorge Correia Jesuino, Influence of Leadership Processes on Group Polarization, 16 Eur. J. Soc.
Psychol. 413, 418 (1986) ("[R]esults confirmed the presence of a significant polarization effect, in
the predicted direction."); Craig McGarty et al., Group Polarization as Conformity to the
Prototypical Group Member, 31 Brit. J. Soc. Psychol. 1, 1 (1992) (finding that results demonstrate
group polarization effect); Serge Moscovici & Marisa Zavalloni, The Group as a Polarizer of
Attitudes, 12 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 125 (1969) (concluding that discussion among French
students enhanced initial positive attitude toward premier, as well as negative attitude toward
Americans); Steve Williams & Robert J. Taormina, Unanimous Versus Majority Influences on
Group Polarization in Business Decision Making, 133 J. Soc. Psychol. 199, 203 (1993) ("Both
unanimous and majority groups thus polarized after discussion, as predicted, but groups of initially
unanimous members were even more extreme than groups in which initial differences of opinion
existed.").
125. See McGarty, supra note 124, at 2. See generally Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarization:
A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 50 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1141 (1986) (examining
studies in support of social comparison or persuasive argument model).
126. See McGarty, supra note 124, at 2.
127. Id.
128. Dominic Abrams et al., Knowing What to Think by Knowing Who You Are: Self-
Categorization and the Nature of Norm Formation, Conformity and Group Polarization, 29 Brit. .
Soc. Psychol. 97, 110 (1990).
129. See Myers, supra note 123, at 337.
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C. Irrationality of the Board's Decision in Riss
The board's actions in Riss suggest the board members lacked
expertise. Prior to an open board meeting, the president of the association
and his wife took photographs in front of various other houses in the
subdivision to illustrate the height'of twenty-three feet, the height of the
Risses' proposed house.30 This "photographic study" failed to take into
account the covenants' specification that a structure's height be
calculated from the highest point of finished grade on the lot; the actual
height of the home is irrelevant. The Risses' proposed house would have
been eleven-and-one-half feet above the highest grade, well within the
maximum height restriction.' Another board member sent a letter to all
the other lot owners before the meeting expressing concern with the
proposal and inaccurately representing the height and square footage of
the proposed house.' These actions demonstrate that the board members
were not well acquainted with the technical requirements of the
covenants, a deficiency that led to an irrational decision to deny the
Risses' proposal.
The board's actions may also have been an example of the group
polarization effect. At least two of the members opposed the Risses'
proposal prior to the meeting that decided the fate of the project. The
other members of the board, already concerned that the Risses' lot was
more visible to those entering the neighborhood,' may have become
even more prejudiced against the proposal through discussion at the
meeting.
Following the meeting, the board notified the Risses that they had
unanimously rejected the plan, 4 even though the proposal complied
with the covenants in all material respects. Whether the rejection resulted
from the board's lack of expertise or the group polarization effect (or a
combination of both), strict procedural guidelines would have helped to
protect the Risses by forcing the board to investigate adequately before
making its decision.
130. Riss v. Angel, 131 Wash. 2d 612,617,934 P.2d 669, 673 (1997).
131. The height restriction of the covenants stated that roof lines were to be no higher than 20 feet
above the highest point of finished grade on the lot. Id
132. The letter stated that the house would have a height of 25 feet, but failed to take into account
the actual covenant Id. at 628, 934 P.2d at 679.
133. Id. at 618, 934 P.2d at 674.
134. Id. at 637, 934 P.2d at 683.
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IV. PROPOSED PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES FOR ARCS TO
FOLLOW WHEN MAKING DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS
The Riss court attempted to protect individual homeowners by
requiring that the ARC's decisionmaking process not be unreasonable or
arbitrary. As a result of this new reasonable procedure requirement,
homeowners associations should reevaluate how their ARCs make
discretionary decisions. Associations seemingly have two options: they
can revoke their ARCs' discretionary power and create very detailed
restrictions in their governing covenants in hope of addressing every
issue, or they can adopt strict procedural guidelines for their ARCs to
follow when making discretionary decisions. Because a detailed,
exclusive list of restrictions may prevent ARCs from responding to
changing circumstances, associations should opt for creating strict
procedural guidelines.
Strict procedural requirements serve at least two purposes. First, they
force some level of rationality into the ARC's decision by requiring the
ARC to support its decision with credible reasoning. For example, if an
ARC must demonstrate in a letter to the applicant the exact reasons for
denying a proposal, the ARC would be forced to consider these reasons
more carefully. The second function served by procedural requirements
is to shield ARCs and associations from liability if ARCs follow the
reasonable procedure guidelines in good faith. Because of Riss, the
unpaid, amateur volunteers who make up ARCs may be inclined simply
to resign from the committees. This would greatly diminish the
enormous amount of good work done by ARCs. Appropriate procedural
guidelines, however, would counteract this effect. If implementing
reasonable procedures constitutes evidence of a reasonable decision-
making process under Riss, then ARC members who act in good faith
and in accordance with these procedures need not fear liability for
rejecting a homeowner's proposal.
Although the Riss court did not set forth a general procedure for ARCs
to follow, the court did explain its reasons for finding that the Mercia
board's decisionmaking process was unreasonable. Extrapolating from
the court's reasoning, the remainder of this section proposes specific
procedural guidelines that will enable ARCs to meet the Riss standard
when making discretionary decisions.
Before an ARC or other governing body may make discretionary
decisions, it must be empowered to do so in the association's enabling
Vol. 73:433, 1998
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documents.'35 Once authorized, an ARC must apply its discretionary
power consistently.'36 Furthermore, the ARC must always comply with
the specific requirements set forth in those documents and may not
impose restrictions "more burdensome" than the covenants provide.'37
Once the ARC has received a proposal, the committee should meet
within a reasonable time to discuss potential concerns, keeping a detailed
record of its discussions and activities. It should investigate the size and
height, view and proximity, and aesthetics of the proposed project. In
addition, the committee should notify applicants and explain the reasons
for its decision.
First, if the ARC is concerned about the overall size or height of a
proposed structure, it should conduct an objective comparison study.38
The study should compare existing houses in the development with the
proposed house and clearly demonstrate that the proposed house would
be "out of place" in the development.
Second, if the ARC is concerned about the negative impact on
neighboring views or the proximity to neighboring residences, it should
physically visit the site and interview surrounding neighbors, recording
135. In Riss, the court noted that vague approval standards "have been upheld where covenants
with such standards clearly established that discretion to approve had been granted." Id. at 625, 934
P.2d at 677.
136. The Riss court declared that a covenant requiring a structure to be in harmony with
surroundings "will not be enforced where it has been applied so inconsistently as to result in a wide
variety of buildings." Id.
137. Id at 625, 934 P.2d at 677. The court stated that "[i]f covenants include specific restrictions
as to some aspect of design or construction, the document manifests the parties' intent that the
specific restriction apply rather an inconsistent standard under a general consent to construction
covenant." Id. at 625-26, 934 P.2d at 677-78. It held, however, that the board had no discretion to
permit a house that did not satisfy the minimum square footage requirement, but did have discretion
to deny a house that satisfied the minimum requirement but was inharmonious with the surrounding
houses because of its extraordinary size. Seemingly, the board would be imposing restrictions "more
burdensome" than those contained in the covenants. This part of the Riss holding needs to be
clarified by the court. The court may have meant that if specific requirements in the covenant
foreclose consideratiorr under a general standard, the specific requirements control. The court noted
that "[tihe specific restrictions [in this case] do not foreclose consideration of size and bulk under the
more general provision." Id. at 626, 934 P.2d at 678. Thus, one must consult the applicable
covenants to determine whether the specific restrictions control.
138. The Riss court noted: "There is no evidence in the record that the Board made any objective
comparisons with existing homes to compare size and height, though those were major reasons for
rejecting the proposed plans." Id. at 628, 934 P.2d at 679. The court also noted that "had the
association made valid comparisons of its own, its decision might have been different." Id. at 630,
934 P.2d at 680.
Washington Law Review
any objections in writing. 139 Additionally, the individual making the
proposal should be given the opportunity to be present during the visit,
both to ensure that it actually occurred and that the ARC in fact
addressed the potential problems.
Third, if the ARC has aesthetic concerns about a proposed change, it
should be able to demonstrate that it has consistently applied its
discretionary power within the subdivision. 14' Aesthetic concerns include
most other possible reasons for rejecting a proposed house, such as its
color, type of material, and overall design. Absent consistency, a court is
likely to find an ARC's rejection unreasonable if the decision is based
solely on aesthetic concerns. 41 An ARC may not enforce blanket
prohibitions that are not within the specific restrictions. For example,
courts have invalidated ARC-created bans on factory-built homes 142 and
above-ground swimming pools.'43 Each proposal must be addressed
individually.
If the ARC opposes a plan after completing the necessary
investigation, the committee should write a letter to the applicant
explaining its reason for rejecting the proposal.'" In the letter, the
committee should state clearly, if possible, how the plans could be
changed to satisfy the committee. This letter is very important because it
forces the ARC to support its decision to reject a proposal with solid
reasoning.
139. The supreme court noted there was "no evidence [in the record that] the Board visited the
site, much less with an eye to neighbors' views or privacy." Id. at 628, 934 P.2d at 679; see also
Leonard v. Stoebling, 728 P.2d 1358, 1360-61 (Nev. 1986) (finding ARC's decision unreasonable
because ARC failed to visit site and take neighbor's views into consideration).
140. See supra note 136 and accompanying text; see also McHuron v. Grand Teton Lodge Co.,
899 P.2d 38, 42 (Wyo. 1995) ("Since the Committee in the past had limited other roofs in the
subdivision to either gravel or wood shakes, its decision not to permit fiberglass was in keeping with
that precedent and, therefore, 'reasonable.").
141. See, e.g., Town & Country Estates Ass'n v. Slater, 740 P.2d 668, 669 (Mont. 1987) (holding
"harmony of external design" standard unenforceable where development was mixture of styles).
142. See, e.g., Chesapeake Estates Improvement Ass'n v. Foster, 288 A.2d 329, 333 (Md. 1972)
(invalidating restriction against modular homes). *
143. See, e.g., Westfield Homes, Inc. v. Herrick, 593 N.E.2d 97, 102 (I11. App. Ct. 1992) (holding
blanket restriction against above-ground pools unreasonable).
144. The Riss court noted that "[ifn this case, the Board's decision reflected in the letter to
Plaintiffs was in conclusory language about height, bulk, and proximity." Riss, 131 Wash. 2d at 628,
934 P.2d at 679; see also Oakbrook Civic Ass'n v. Sonnier, 481 So. 2d 1008, 1012 (La. 1986)
(holding that "the conclusory statement of [the ARC chairman] asserting that the building was not
harmonious with the surrounding structures" could not prove that ARC acted reasonably).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Washington seized the opportunity in Riss v.
Angel to declare that strict construction of subdivision covenants no
longer applies in disputes between subdivision homeowners. This case
clarifies Washington law on the enforceability of restrictive covenants
and better reflects modem thinking about the usefulness of restrictive
covenants. Moreover, the decision imposes reasonableness and good
faith requirements on discretionary decisions made by ARCs that will
force these bodies to reform their decisionmaking processes.
In response to Riss, associations should adopt specific procedural
guidelines for their ARCs to follow when making discretionary
decisions. Specific guidelines will better protect individual homeowners
by assuring that ARCs will evaluate proposals using objective criteria.
Furthermore, by adopting specific guidelines according to the general
principles laid out in Riss, ARCs acting in good faith will avoid liability
for challenged decisions.
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